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LIBERALIZING THE AUTHENTICATION OF
PRIVATE WRITINGS
John William Strong-
Despite frequently reiterated questions concerning its wisdom and necessity,
the long-standing requirement that private writings must be authenticated
prior to their admission into evidence continues to possess great vitality.
The author summarizes and evaluates the justifications which have been
offered for the orthodox rule and examines the relative desirability of
various possible approaches to its relaxation. He suggests that the concept
of self-authentication be expanded and that a presumption technique of
self-authentication be used to permit the admission of a private writing
which purports to show its origin on its face.
One can only speculate as to the amount of testimony elicited annually
for the purpose of "authenticating" private writings which are ultimately
to be offered in evidence. It can hardly be doubted, however, that the total
is substantial. Much of this testimony is of a purely pro forma nature and
will never be contested. Moreover, it is frequently of a type so demon-
strably unreliable that it has been questioned whether it should be ad-
mitted even for ritualistic purposes.' The underlying compulsion for the
production of such evidence is, of course, supplied by the familiar doc-
trine that "a writing does not speak for itself," but must be authenticated
by extrinsic evidence.2 This rule has been the object of frequent and
sometimes heated criticism for over a hundred years,' yet it still enjoys
almost universal recognition.
SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF AUTHENTICATION
It may be noted at the outset that the concept of authentication, al-
though continually employed by the courts without apparent difficulty,
seems almost to defy precise definition. McCormick discusses authentica-
tion in its proper but limited sense as proof of authorship, noting that it
may have a wider meaning.4 Morgan, on the other hand, suggests that
authenticity of a writing is the quality of its "being what it purports to
be or what its proponent claims it to be." 5 Wigmore attempts to be more
t Assistant Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. Visiting Assistant Professor,
Duke University Law School, 1966-1967. A.B. 1957, Yale University; LL.B. 1962, Uni-
versity of Illinois.
1 Inbau, "Lay Witness Identification of Handwriting," 34 Ill. L. Rev. 433, 441 n.13
(1939).
2 See, e.g., Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569, 578, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 621 (1934);
see also Annot., 131 A.L.R. 301 (1941) for a collection of cases on the doctrine.
3 See the quotation of Jeremy Bentham in 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2148, at 606 n.1 (3d
ed. 1940).
4 McCormick, Evidence § 185 (1954).
5 2 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 378 (1961).
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precise about what types of claims by the proponent of a writing will
necessitate authentication, stating that "when a claim or offer involves
impliedly or expressly any element of personal connection with a corporeal
object, that connection must be made to appear .... "I
Wigmore also asserts that the requirement of authentication, i.e., of
making any claim of personal connection with a corporeal object "appear,"
rests upon inherent logical necessity.7 Certainly it may be conceded that
the relevancy of a writing to a particular material issue raised in litiga-
tion will frequently be logically dependent upon the existence of some
connection between that writing and a particular individual. If A sues B
for libel and attempts to introduce into evidence a writing containing
libelous statements, it will readily appear that the writing is relevant only
if some connection between the writing and B exists, as where B authored
or published it. The real question, however, is not whether there is any
logical necessity for the connection, but rather what standards shall be
applied to determine when some connection with B has been made to
appear.
If the fact that the writing in question bears B's name is added to the
hypothetical situation above, it might then be suggested that B's connec-
tion with the writing does appear. Even Wigmore concedes that "in the
vast majority of transactions in everyday life, persons do act upon just
such evidence of authenticity and no more."' On what grounds, then, do
the courts refuse to act upon this same "evidence" of authenticity? Essen-
tially two justifications, compounded by a third, are frequently suggested
or implied.
The first and principal justification for what has appropriately been
termed "this common law attitude of agnosticism as to the authorship of
documents," 9 is that to abandon or relax it would open the gates to poten-
tial fraud. Thus, it is conceivable that the libelous writing previously
adduced by way of example represents not the work of B but that of some
third person who, for reasons of his own, wishes to embroil B in diffi-
culties,10 or to libel A without suffering any adverse consequences. In
addition, there is the possibility that A has himself fabricated the letter -in
order to afford himself the basis for a suit.
A second justification, rarely mentioned explicitly but arguably support-
ing the position that some authentication of private writings should be
6 7 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2129, at 564.
7 Ibid.
8 Id. § 2148, at 606.
9 McCormick, Cases and Materials on the Law of Evidence 388 n.4 (3d ed. 1956).
10 See Hughes v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N.W. 589 (1917) in which an under-
taker mailed the business card of a competitor to a man whose wife was seriously ill.
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required, is that such a requirement prevents not only fraud but also
mistake. Mistake is not used here in McCormick's sense, as applicable
to the instance in which a fraudulent writing is offered by a proponent
ignorant of the fraud;" rather it is used to designate the possibility of
mistake resulting simply from a confusion of individuals and not from
fraud on the part of anyone. For example, A offers in evidence a writing
bearing the name of B. It is possible, as already suggested, that the
writing is the fraudulent product of A himself, or of X, a third person. But
it is also possible that the writing is legitimately connected with some B
(i.e., an individual with B's name) other than the one against whom it is
offered.
Obviously, the possibility of this type of mistake is much greater in
some cases than in others. If a letter is received whose authorship is
suggested simply by the initials "J. S.," or even by the signature "John
Smith," there is appreciably more danger that the recipient will attribute
authorship to the wrong J. S. or John Smith than if the same letter had
arrived on letterhead stationery indicating, for example, the address, busi-
ness, and names of the associates of a particular John Smith. Of course,
the presence of such particularizing indices in the writing is of no logical
significance where authentication is accomplished by the traditional means
of proving the signature to be that of a particular individual; such proof
will logically exclude the possibility of mistake as well as of fraud.
However, if, for example, letters written on letterhead stationery are
admitted without formal proof of authenticity by the party offering the
letter into evidence,12 then the same problem is raised as in the case of
writings traditionally viewed as "self-authenticating;" no matter how
many indicia are contained in the letter, it may logically be argued that
proof is still lacking that the party against whom the letter is offered
possesses the specified characteristics."3 Should formal proof of those facts
be required? If so, relatively little has been gained by calling the letter
"self-authenticating." 14
Wigmore suggests a final justification for maintaining some require-
ments of proof of authenticity. Judicial emphasis of such requirements is
11 Cf. McCormick, supra note 4, at 396.
12 See Ehrich, "Unnecessary Difficulties of Proof," 32 Yale L.J. 436, 443 (1923).
18 Whitelocke v. Musgrove, 1 Cr. & M. 511, 522, 149 Eng. Rep. 502, 506 (Ex. 1833):
I quite agree that it is not necessary to prove the hand-writing of the defendant; but
if you do not prove that, you must prove something else to connect the party sued with
the instrument . . . . [IUn most cases you can either shew some acknowledgement,
or prove that the party, from his residence or other circumstances, answers the descrip-
tion on the face of the note ....
[Emphasis added.]
14 See text accompanying notes 23-49 supra for a proposal that the class of "self-authenti-
cating" writings be broadened.
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necessary to combat a psychological tendency to assume the connection of
a writing with a particular individual when such a connection is suggested,
no matter how inconclusively, by the writing itself.'5 Such a tendency
might, of course, obscure recognition by the trier of fact of the two possi-
bilities previously described-fraud and mistake. 6
LIBERALIZATION THROUGH LIMITED "SELF-AUTHENTICATION"
It cannot be denied that fraud, mistake, or undue jury credulity are
omnipresent possibilities, nor can it be denied that effective measures are
desirable to minimize or eliminate the possible effect of these factors on
the litigation process. However, rules supposedly designed to further such
ends should be sufficiently necessary and efficacious to justify the ex-
penditures of time, trouble, and money required to comply with them. The
legislative evaluation of these competing considerations has on occasion
been at odds with the judicial evaluation, and scattered statutes are pres-
ently to be found which in effect provide for the "self-authentication" of
particular limited types of writings."
A more general approach to the problem is suggested by the 1963
Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence. 8 In
the comment appended to its proposed revision of Uniform Rule 67, the
Committee stated:
In cases that justify it, the trial judge should be free to use the presump-
tion technique, whereby a writing in some cases is considered to be presump-
tively authentic, the burden of going forward with evidence attacking its
authenticity as a preliminary matter shifting to the opponent.19
15 7 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2130.
16 It may be noted that this argument, somewhat difficult to assess, would seem to
some extent contradicted by Wigmore's own example of the Salem trial for blasphemy of
the Quaker Thomas Maule. The allegedly blasphemous book bearing Maule's name having
been introduced, and the defendant having argued in his own behalf:
[T]he jury returned a verdict of Not Guilty. The Court, "after expressing much dis-
satisfaction at the result, asked the jury how they could return such a verdict with the
book before them," and was answered by the jury, "The book was not sufficient
evidence, for Thomas Maule's name was placed there by the printer."
7 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2149, at 608. See also Ehrich, supra note 12, at 451: "If spurious
evidence is admitted, its authenticity can generally be met by a direct denial, and the jury
has an uncanny instinct for apprehending the truth in these matters."
17 Cal. Labor Code § 973; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-36(c) (1955); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68,
§ 245 (1959); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 377.275(6) (1965).
18 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence 223 (1963).
19 Ibid. It is not precisely clear from the committee's sketchy summary of the suggested
presumption technique whether utilization of the technique will result in the admission of
the writing, leaving the trier of fact ultimately to determine the question of authenticity
in light of any rebuttal evidence offered by the opponent, or whether it will result in shifting
the burden of going forward with evidence of nonauthenticity immediately to the opponent
with the judge then to make a preliminary determination of fact as he would of a fact
conditioning admissibility under a technical exclusionary rule. Questions of authenticity are
usually handled in the former manner. See McCormick, supra note 4, § 53, at 125-26. The
merit of this methodology where rebuttal evidence of authenticity is to be offered, however,
has been questioned. Maguire & Epstein, "Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the
Admissibility of Evidence," 40 Harv. L. Rev. 392, 399-400 (1927).
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The comment, however, is not overly specific in describing which cases are
those "that justify" use of the presumption technique, stating only that it
would have been ideally suited to the circumstances in the widely-criti-
cized case of Keegan v. Green Giant Co.2 0
With respect to specifics, then, a few suggestions should be made.
Though private writings vary tremendously-deeds, contracts, letters,
memoranda, signs, brochures, advertisements, newspapers, receipts,
tickets, and labels being only a few of the types which may be sought to be
introduced-nevertheless all writings may be roughly classified in one of
three categories. First, there are writings the relevancy of which is de-
pendent upon a connection with one or more of the parties to the suit in
which they are offered. Second, there are those writings whose relevancy
is dependent upon a connection with someone other than a party. Third,
there are writings the relevancy of which does not depend upon a con-
nection with anyone in particular,2 ' or at least not upon such a connection
as is generally thought to require "authentication."22 Writings falling in
the latter category of course are of no significance to the present question.
With respect to the first category, it should perhaps be inquired whether
a case can be made for allowing such writings to be admitted without
preliminary authentication. Abandonment or relaxation of current au-
thentication for writings in this category (as well as for other private
writings) might raise the possibility of mistake, which is logically if not
realistically precluded by the use of existing methods of authentication.
Thus it would appear reasonable to deny admissibility to a postcard
signed with the initials "W. C.," even when it is offered against a party
possessing those initials.2" The possibility of mistake, however (though
not that of fraud), is substantially reduced in the case of a writing bear-
ing either a distinctive name, or a nondistinctive name coupled with other
data reasonably referrable to a single individual or one of a limited class
of individuals. But as previously suggested, there is a further question of
20 150 Me. 283, 110 A.2d 599 (1954); see discussion at text accompanying notes 40-41
infra.
21 See 7 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2132. Where the relevancy of a writing depends upon
a connection with the proponent, the problems raised are of a somewhat different nature
then those considered here. The proponent of a writing may of course testify to its
authenticity in many cases. Jones v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 90 Ga. App. 667, 83
S.E.2d 837 (1954). The most difficult problem likely to arise in situations where the
connection is with the proponent will occur when all of those persons who have contributed
to the writing are unavailable.
22 See the venerable case of Winslow v. Bailey, 16 Me. 319 (1839). There the defendants
offered in evidence the certificate of one Jameson concerning the extent and quality of cer-
tain timber land, on the theory that the certificate had been used by the plaintiffs to induce
the defendants to purchase. The fact conditioning relevancy here then was not Jameson's
authorship, but whether the certificate had been used for the purpose contended. See also
People v. Adamson, 118 Cal. App. 2d 714, 258 P.2d 1020 (1953).
23 See Covington v. State, 15 Ga. App. 513, 83 S.E. 867 (1914).
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whether avoidance of mistake would still require formal proof (or estab-
lishment by some other means) that the distinguishing characteristics
attributed to its author by a writing are in -fact possessed by the party
against whom the writing is offered.24
The leading case of Mancari v. Frank P. Smith, Inc.2 5 illustrates the
nature of this problem. There the plaintiff sought to introduce into evi-
dence a printed flier apparently designed to promote the sale of men's
shoes and bearing the name "Frank P. Smith, Inc." The trial court ex-
cluded the flier for want of authentication, and the appellate court af-
firmed. In dissent, Judge Rutledge was at some pains to point out that the
defendant had admitted by its pleading that it was in the business of retail-
ing men's shoes, and it was therefore likely to have been responsible for
the flier.2 Judge Rutledge's emphasis on defendant's admission might
suggest that, had an admission of the identifying nature of defendant's
business not been elicited by a routine allegation of the plaintiff, the latter
would then have been obliged to produce proof of the fact. The principal
significance of the defendant's business, however, would seem to be to
strengthen the inference, which could possibly be drawn from defendant's
name alone, that it was the Frank P. Smith, Inc. with which the flier
purported a connection. Of course, the same fact would have little, if any,
tendency to eliminate the possibility that someone had fraudulently caused
the defendant's name to appear on the flier. If such possibilities of fraud
are considered too minimal to warrant rejection of a writing (a position
which Judge Rutledge apparently espoused in the Mancari case), it would
seem appropriate, in cases where the writing carries sufficient indicia of
the particular individual to whom it relates, to follow the practice common
with respect to writings long recognized as probably free from fraudulent
preparation. Thus when a properly certified record of conviction or judg-
ment is offered as relating to a party or person possessing the same name
as appears in the record, identity of parties is frequently presumed from
the identity of names There would appear to be little possibility that
such a presumption, if applied in a case like Mancari, would result in in-
justice through mistake. In the unlikely event that the plaintiff had chosen
to sue a Frank P. Smith, Inc. engaged in the used car business, that fact
could easily have been presented by the defendant. 8 If use of the concept
24 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
25 114 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
26 Id. at 838 (dissenting opinion).
27 See cases collected in 9 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2529, at 456 n-5. The presumption
was relied upon, inter alia, to uphold the admission of a letter signed "Gus Guasti," against
a defendant of that name in People v. Guasti, 110 Cal. App. 2d 456, 243 P.2d 59 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1952).
28 This view is suggested by the dissent in Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 288,
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of self-authentication were to be extended, then it is suggested that ade-
quate protection against mistake would be afforded by limiting the ap-
plicability of the concept to writings which on their face suggest a connec-
tion with a single or limited class of reasonably identifiable individuals.
The principal justification which has been offered in support of main-
taining current modes of authentication is that they are essential for the
prevention of fraud.2 9 However, it has frequenly been observed that
existing standards of authentication create only a slight obstacle to the
witting or unwitting presentation of forged writings. 0 One approach to
the existing situation, then, would be to raise required standards to the
point where the obstacle becomes a significant one. The difficulty with
this approach, which no one appears to have recommended, is that a dis-
position toward "fraud" is not limited solely to the proponents of writings.
Thus to raise the standards for proof of authenticity would appear inad-
visable in light of the fact, which even Wigmore concedes, that "the diffi-
culty of authenticating.., is sometimes taken advantage of by those who
wish to be able to disavow their authorship."'" In light of this ambivalent
situation, several considerations would seem to warrant the greater use of
"self-authentication" or a "presumption technique" of authentication with
respect to a number of private writings.
The first of these considerations is that of probability. Of course,
probability has frequently been urged to warrant the free admission of
private writings, based on the observation drawn from ordinary experience
that most private writings, and even most private writings offered into
evidence, are not in fact the products of fraud but are connected with
those with whom they purport to be connected. This consideration alone
would appear to some extent applicable to most, if 'not all, private writ-
ings which purport to show their origin on their faces. But though recog-
nition of this fact might arguably be justified by the saving of the time,
trouble, and expense necessary to authenticate the majority of writings
which are genuine,8 2 the courts have not considered it sufficient.
It has been noted, however, that most recognized presumptions are sup-
110 A.2d 559, 601 (1954), discussed at notes 40-41 infra, in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully
sought to introduce a can labeled with the words "Distributed by Green Giant Company
Le Suer, Minn." justice Williamson stated: "Surely we may assume that the defendant
does in fact distribute a product of the type described in the label. If this were not so, it
could readily have disposed of the case." Id. at 289, 110 A.2d at 602 (dissenting opinion).
29 See, e.g., United Factories, Inc. v. Brigham, 117 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. 1938). The
leading exponent of the fraud theory is of course Wigmore. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 3, §
2148.
30 McCormick, supra note 4, § 185, at 395-96; Levin, "Authentication and Content of
Writings," 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 632, 637 (1956).
81 7 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2149, at 608.
32 See McCormick, supra note 4.
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ported by two or more justifications, 83 and perhaps a presumption tech-
nique of authentication in the case of certain types of private writings may
be justifiable upon a ground additional to probability. When a private
writing is introduced against a party with whom it purports to be con-
nected, that party will generally possess superior access to proof concern-
ing whether or not that connection in fact exists. Superior access is often
asserted as a basis for many recognized presumptions, 4 and may similarly
be urged as an additional justification for an expanded use of self-authen-
tication in the case of private writings. The proponent of a writing, unless
he is a party to its fraudulent manufacture, will rarely have definite per-
sonal knowledge concerning the writing's authenticity, a fact to which
most of the present problems of authentication are attributable. There-
fore, the expedient available to the opponent of a challenged writing in a
great number of instances is simply to take the stand and, as the person
in the best position to know the fraudulent nature of the writing, deny its
authenticity under oath.85 As a method of preventing fraud, of course,
this expedient may be somewhat less than totally effective. The trier of
fact may give little weight to the testimony, cynically believing that a de-
nial is to be expected in any event, or he may succumb to the psychologi-
cal tendency cited by Wigmore to let writings, being tangible, speak
louder than words.8 Other factors, too, may render the expedient of
denial unavailable. Where the opponent is a natural person, uncertain
memory may preclude a categorical denial; where a corporation, the loci
of knowledge may be too diffused for convincing denial by a single or
limited number of witnesses.
However, the generally superior knowledge relating to authenticity
possessed by a party with whom a writing purports to be connected is not
limited solely to that which will enable him to make a bald denial. Infor-
mation that merely concerns or describes his own whereabouts and
activities will frequently provide the basis for a more colorable denial of
authenticity. Suppose a writing purports to have been written by the
opponent to its authenticity in his home town on a certain date. Basis for
a denial of authenticity and a claim of fraud would appear if the opponent
83 Morgan, 'Tresumptions," 12 Wash. L. Rev. 255, 259 (1937).
84 Morgan lists superior access to proof as one of seven justifications which may be said
to support the recognition of the various existing presumptions. Id. at 258; see also Mc-
Cormick, supra note 4, § 309, at 641.
35 Failure to adopt this expedient under circumstances suggesting it would have been
readily available has been noted by some courts which have refused to reverse for the
admission of improperly authenticated writings. Richmond Dredging Co. v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry., 31 Cal. App. 399, 160 Pac. 862 (1916) (purported author, in court, failed to
deny authenticity); see also Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Kull, 176 Ark. 966, 4 S.W.2d 926
(1928).
386 See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
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could show that on that date he was in the middle of a European tour."
The ease with which such proof might be made by the opponent stands in
marked contrast to the difficulty facing a proponent in a case such as
Gartrell v. Stafford.38 There the plaintiff sought to rely upon an alleged
contract arising from a series of letters purporting to have been signed by
the defendant in California. Rejecting an attempted invocation of the
reply doctrine,39 the court held that the alleged letters of the defendant
were improperly authenticated in the absence of proof that the defendant
actually was in California on the date of the first letter of the series. Had
the defendant not been in California on the crucial date, that fact would
certainly have been some indication of a possible attempt at fraud. Yet it
would seem eminently more sensible to follow a practice of compelling
the opponent to come forward with proof of such a fact, as to which he will
almost invariably possess superior knowledge.
Facts of which the opponent of a writing may have superior knowledge,
and which if demonstrated will lend support to a contention of fraud, are
of unlimited variety. In the case of Keegan v. Green Giant Co.,4 ° for
example, the plaintiff had suffered personal injuries after eating the con-
tents of a can of peas. She offered in evidence the can from which the
offending peas had come, labeled with the defendant's name, and bearing
on the can itself the imprinted letters and numbers "ACFC5" "3LY."
Dissenting from an opinion which upheld the trial court's exclusion of
the can from evidence, Justice Williamson noted that "They [the im-
prints] have no meaning to the purchaser. A distributor can readily tell
us whether they identify its own product."41
Still another type of proof which may lead to the revelation of attempted
fraud, and which the party allegedly responsible for a challenged writing
may frequently be in a superior position to provide, is that available by
37 See Swett, "The Dating of Typewriting," 50 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 86, 88 (1959).
38 12 Neb. 545, 11 N.W. 732 (1882).
39 Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb. 545, 553-54, 11 N.W. 732, 735 (1882).
40 150 Me. 283, 110 A.2d 599 (1954).
41 Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 289, 110 A.2d 599, 602 (1954) (dissenting
opinion). The most satisfactory approach, to the present writer, to the frequently arising
problem of authenticating a trade-marked article is succinctly stated by the court in the
unusual case of Weiner v. Mager & Throne, Inc., 167 Misc. 338, 3 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.C.
Munic. Ct. 1938):
Did Mager and Throne, Inc., manufacture this loaf of bread? .. . This defendant's
trade label, affixed to the loaf, is some evidence that it manufactured the bread; and
unless rebutted, or at least contested by evidence, gives rise to a reasonable inference
that the owner of the trade label manufactured the article to which it was affixed ....
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that this defendant's trade name or
label was being wrongfully used by others, the inference is drawn that the name and
label were used by it, and that this defendant was the manufacturer of the bread.
Id. at 340, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 920-21. Another decision which less clearly intimates that the
owner of a trade name reasonably may be expected to know and demonstrate that others
are utilizing it is Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932). But
cf. Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 62 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1933).
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virtue of the increasingly sophisticated techniques for examination of
questioned documents.42 As is true with respect to the face of writings,
of course, the physical characteristics of a writing may be insufficient to
enable even a highly skilled examiner to demonstrate its fraudulent
nature.4" Nevertheless, in many instances, such techniques can undoubt-
edly be very effective in the detection of fraud, and their very existence
may have a deterrent effect. Though such techniques will not deter the
proponent of a writing who is unaware that he proposes to introduce a
forgery or is either ignorant of modern techniques or skeptical of their
efficacy, nevertheless writings are ultimately offered by attorneys who,
at least since 88 A.D., have been exhorted in the interest of their own
professional reputations to ascertain the authenticity of writings in ad-
vance where any question appears.44
It might appear that the proponent of a writing, since he will in per-
haps a majority of cases be in possession of it, would have a superior
opportunity to provide scientific proof of authentication. In line with this
theory, Wigmore suggests that there is little need for liberal allowance of
authentication by content in the case of typewritten documents, in view
of the development of typewriter identification.45 Both handwriting and
typewriting identification, however, proceed largely by sample or "stan-
dard,"246 with the possibility of positive identification increasing in direct
proportion to the number of standards. Furthermore, for positive type-
writer identification it is desirable that the standards be as close in time
to the questioned writing as possible. It may be suggested, then, that
Wigmore is overly sanguine concerning the ease of the task facing the
proponent of an entirely typewritten letter purporting to have emanated
from a large business office.48 In comparison, it may be easier for a party
allegedly connected with such a writing to procure it for comparison with
standards on file from various machines available to him than it is for the
42 See generally, Baker, Law of Disputed and Forged Documents (1955).
43 Ashton, "Questioned Documents and the Law," 1 J. For. Sd. 101, 108-09 (1956).
44 See the often-cited statement of Quintilian quoted in Osborn, Questioned Documents
xvi (2d ed. 1929):
We may often, too, find a thread broken, or wax disturbed, or signatures without
attestation; all which points, unless we settle them at home, will embarrass us un-
expectedly in the forum; and evidence which we are obliged to give up will damage
a cause more than it would have suffered from none having been offered.
For a more modern statement to the same effect, see Moore, "The Questioned Typewritten
Document," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 727, 752 (1959).
45 7 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2149, at 608.
46 As to the importance of standards for examination of handwriting, see Packard,
"Some Elementary Points in Document Examination," 1 Crim. L.Q. 219 (1958); for the
same as to typewriting, see Moore, supra note 44.
47 Id. at 735.
48 A factual situation illustrating this problem is found in Comanche Mercantile Co. v.
McCall Co., 52 Okla. 782, 153 Pac. 675 (1915).
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proponent to obtain leave to ransack those same files in search of appro-
priate standards.4 9
It is not suggested on the basis of the foregoing that in all cases in-
volving writings which purport a connection with the party against whom
they are offered are the factors of probability of authenticity and supe-
rior access to proof present in equal degrees.50 On the other hand, in the
case of third-party writings, the consideration of probability of authen-
ticity alone might suggest that some capacity for self-authentication be
extended to them.5' Moreover, it may occasionally appear even with
respect to a third-party writing that the opponent has greater access to
proof of nonauthenticity than does the proponent to proof of authen-
ticity.2 As a generality, however, it would seem warranted to say that with
respect to party writings, both probability of authenticity and superior
access to proof by the opponent of the writing are usually present in vary-
ing degrees, while with respect to third-party writings, at least the factor
of superior access to proof by the opponent is frequently absent.
ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR LIBERALIZATION OF AUTHENTICATION
REQUIREMENTS
If, as has been suggested by virtually every commentator who has dealt
with the subject, the requirements of authentication of private writings
49 It may be worthy of note that scientific exclusion of a particular author or typewriter
may frequently be established more conclusively than a positive identification of a particular
source. Unfortunately, the former sort of proof is not always as soul-satisfying as the
latter. On these points see Harrison, "Aspects of Forensic Science," 1955 Crim. L. Rev. 407.
50 Superior access to proof concerning the authenticity of a writing purporting a con-
nection with the party against whom offered would, at least initially, appear equal where
the nature of the writing itself indicates participation by some "neutral" third person
such as a telegrapher or a printer. Wigmore suggests that "there is usually available as
much evidence of the act of . . . handing to a printer as there would be of any other
act, such as chopping a tree or building a fence." 7 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2150, at
608. At the same time, printers and telegraphers are not immune to defects of memory. Cf.
Tracy, "The Introduction of Documentary Evidence," 24 Iowa L. Rev. 436, 447 (1939).
In this case the opponent would appear to have a superior position regarding production
of proof.
51 But see Evola Realty Co. v. Westerfield, 251 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1952) (denying ad-
mission of certain purported bulletins of the F.H.A. on grounds, inter alia, of lack of authen-
tication in a case in which the probabilities of authenticity would appear fairly strong).
52 Cases in which a writing purporting a connection with a decedent is offered against
the latter's personal representative present some problem of classification as "party" or
"third-person" writings. Frequently, of course, the personal representative will appear
to have superior access to some of the types of proof available to a living party. In Plunkett
v. Simmons, 63 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), a will contest case, the court held that
testimony concerning certain letters purportedly authored by the decedent had been properly
excluded by the trial court, noting among other considerations that the proponents offered
no evidence concerning the location in Texas from which the letters had purportedly
emanated. Had such evidence been offered, a personal representative might have been in a
superior position to offer rebuttal evidence suggesting the possibility of fraud or mistake.
Compare the discussion of Gartrell v. Stafford at text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
Since writings purportedly authored by decedents may involve somewhat greater than ordi-
nary possibilities of fraud, perhaps they should be classified for present purposes as writings
purporting a connection with one not a party.
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are in need of liberalization," there would appear to be essentially three
possible techniques available for the purpose. The first, of course, is the
formulation either legislatively or judicially, of an increasingly greater
number of specialized rules governing the authentication of particular
types of writings, or of particular types of writings as to which a relatively
well-defined set of circumstances may be shown. The ancient documents
rule 4 and the reply doctrine55 are perhaps the most familiar examples of
configurations of circumstantial evidence which are generally deemed
sufficient to demonstrate authenticity for purposes of admission. These
rules, particularly the latter, may be at least partially justified on the
ground that once the requisite circumstances are shown concerning a par-
ticular writing, the probability of its authenticity is materially increased
over that of private writings generally.5
Other sets of circumstances have also been recognized, although not
with the same unanimity, as worthy of special consideration. Thus, it is
said that required reports, even though purporting to be prepared by
private individuals, are properly authenticated by their production from
the official custody into which the law requires them to be delivered.57
This view has found legislative approval in a frequently cited Oklahoma
statute which provides that the "fact that an individual's name is signed
to a filed [income tax] return shall be prima facie evidence for all pur-
poses that the return was actually signed by him.15 8 Probabilities again
suggest that such writings are likely to be genuine, given the assumptions
that public officials charged with the duty of receiving reports are not
likely to fabricate or alter them, and that unauthorized persons are not
likely to prepare and file reports bearing the names of those required by
law to do so.
53 E.g., McCormick, supra note 4; Levin, supra note 30, at 637; Ehrich, supra note 12.
Even Wigmore suggests greater liberality in the acceptance of a wider range of circum-
stantial evidence to authenticate, 7 Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2131, at 573.
54 Under this rule, the genuineness of ancient documents is established by circumstantial
evidence, e.g., age, place of custody, etc. The rule enables such documents to be admitted
though testimonal proof is unavailable because of the lapse of time. See 7 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2137, at 581 (3d ed. 1940).
55 The reply doctrine is stated by Wigmore as follows: "These facts, namely, the arrival
by mail of a reply purporting to be from the addressee of a prior letter duly addressed and
mailed, are sufficient evidence of the reply's genuineness to go to the jury." Id. § 2153, at
612.
56 See Whelton v. Daly, 93 N.H. 150, 37 A.2d 1 (1944):
It is a fair inference, considering the habitual accuracy of the mails, that the letter
addressed to B reached the real B and that an answer, referring to the tenor of A's
letter and coming back in due course of mail, leaves only a negligible chance that any
other than B has become acquainted with the contents of A's letter so as to forge
a reply.
Id. at 154, 37 A.2d at 4.
57 Sternberg Dredging Co .v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 196 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.
1952); McCormick, Evidence § 191 (1954).
58 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 245 (1959).
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It would seem permissible to go even further. Statutes can be found
which provide for the admissibility of instruments bearing what purports
to be a corporate seal and create the additional "presumption" that any
person whose signature appears on the writing shall prima facie be deemed
to have possessed authority to execute the writing in the corporation's
behalf. 9 Such statutes are justified by the improbability that many
persons would go to the extent of procuring spurious corporate seals in
order to execute forgeries of such instruments. Further, it may be assumed
that if the seal upon a corporate instrument is genuine, it is unlikely that
a person unauthorized to execute sealed instruments will have had access
to it.
60
The same type of considerations might to a lesser degree support the
recognition of a "letterhead doctrine," the possibility of which has been
suggested, if not recognized.6 The impediment to fraud here may be
somewhat less, since printing is less costly than seal-manufacture and
access to the genuine article is more widespread. But the possibility of
fraud is at least relatively reduced. Again, the frequently recurring prob-
lem of the trade-marked item might present a legitimate situation for a
specialized presumption of authenticity, as infringement of trade-marks
is prohibited and the theft of the genuine article constitutes a crime.62
Such a list of possibilities might be extended ad infinitum. It has been
said, however, that "most modern commentators are agreed that modes
of authentication are, by and large, unrealistically technical." 63 Certainly
this fault will not be properly remedied by the indefinite proliferation of
even more technical and specialized doctrines.
A second method of approach to the liberalization of existing modes of
authentication is to proceed essentially on an ad hoc basis. A significant
number of courts have displayed considerable willingness to view a wide
variety of circumstantial evidence, when produced by the proponent of a
writing, as sufficient to authenticate, even though such evidence does not
fall within any recognized formal rule.64 Despite this willingness, however,
the burden still rests upon the proponent of a private writing to exercise
his ingenuity in obtaining and producing circumstantial evidence of
authenticity. A suggestion of the New Jersey Committee on Evidence, dis-
59 E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-36(c) (1955); Cal. Corp. Code § 833.
60 Without benefit of statute, some courts have been willing to accept the latter proposi-
tion, but not the former. See Robertson v. Burstein, 105 NJ.L. 375, 146 Atl. 355 (1929).
61 See Ehrich, supra note 12, at 443.
62 These considerations in the case of a trade-marked and labeled item are extensively
set forth in Note, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1095, 1097 (1955) (commenting upon Keegan v.
Green Giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 110 A.2d 599 (1954) discussed at text accompanying notes
40-41 supra).
62 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence 224 (1963).
64 E.g., Champion v. Champion, 368 Mich. 84, 117 N.W.2d 107 (1962).
[Vol. 52
AUTHENTICATION OF PRIVATE WRITINGS
cussed previously, 5 goes somewhat further in its recognition of the pos-
sibility that particular cases may arise in which a trial court might
appropriately "presume" authenticity, either by automatically admitting
the writing into evidence, or admitting it if the opponent does not present
counter evidence.66
These two manifestations of what has been called the ad hoc approach to
authentication, and particularly the latter, would appear to possess con-
siderable potential in minimizing one danger attendant upon too rigorous
standards of authentication, i.e., that genuine and otherwise admissible
writings will be excluded from evidence for lack of "proper" authenticat-
ing proof. However, neither the liberal allowance of authentication by
circumstantial evidence, nor a presumption of authenticity utilized in cases
where the trial court deems it warranted, appear completely satisfactory
as devices for avoiding the current necessity of accumulating proof of the
authenticity of authentic writings. Even when a writing is to be offered
before a court "free" to presume its authenticity in cases that "warrant
it," few proponents will care to gamble upon the favorable exercise of the
court's discretion if any possibility for obtaining conventional proof of
authenticity exists.
67
It may be suggested, of course, that even this latter objection is not
crucial in the now significant number of jurisdictions which have adopted
a request for admissions procedure similar to that embodied in Federal
Rule 36.68 Ideally, where available and fully utilized, such a procedure
should serve to eliminate the necessity for procuring and producing proof
of the authenticity of writings whose authenticity will not ultimately be
contested. However, it may be open to some question whether this de-
sirable result will obtain in light of current requirements of authentication,
or even under the New Jersey suggestion of recognition of presumptive
authenticity on a selective basis. The sanction provided by the Federal
Rules to prevent frivolous denials of facts which are not contested is, of
course, the imposition upon the recalcitrant party of costs of proof.69 In
the case of many writings such as those on labeled and trade-marked
65 See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
66 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
67 Authentication even of writings presenting the most difficult problems has on occa-
sion been accomplished by a determined accumulation of circumstantial evidence. See, e.g.,
DeGroat v. Ward Baking Co., 102 N.JL. 188, 130 Ati. 540 (1925); Cheli v. Cudahy Bros.
Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414 (1934).
68 Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 provides in part:
After commencement of an action a party may serve upon any other party a writ-
ten request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents
described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of
fact set forth in the request.
69 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
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articles, however, the opponent, despite the probabilities inherent in the
situation, may with some legitimacy claim an inability to admit or deny.
In such a situation no sanction is available even though satisfactory and
uncontested proof of authenticity is subsequently offered.70 In addition,
where a request for admission of genuineness involves a writing which is
potentially pivotal to the litigation, there would appear to be a substantial
temptation for the opponent to deny the request and incur the somewhat
problematic risk of imposition of costs,7 even though authenticity would
not be contested if the proponent could find satisfactory proof. From the
standpoint of the opponent there exist the not insubstantial possibilities
that the proponent may fail to exhibit the requisite ingenuity in unearthing
satisfactory proof, or may find that advancing the costs of such proof
burdensome or prohibitive," or finally, possessing both ingenuity and
money, may still be unable to authenticate satisfactorily. The mere chance
that the trial court may in its discretion indulge in a presumption of au-
thenticity and admit the writing would not appear materially to lessen the
possible temptation to gamble upon the occurrence of these possibilities
by denying a request for admission of authenticity.
A third possibility for the liberalization of existing modes of authentica-
tion is that which has been set forth here, i.e., the positive extension of the
capacity for self-authentication to a broadly defined class of private
writings. The division here suggested, between writings which on their face
purport a connection with the party against whom offered, and writings
purporting a connection with some third person, admittedly is not com-
pletely satisfactory. Nevertheless, such a division would at least possess
the virtue of simplicity and of corresponding ease of application. In addi-
tion, the fact that superior knowledge and access to proof of nonauthen-
ticity are attributed to a party with whom a writing purports a connection
should in many cases minimize the possibilities of fraud and mistake.
These possibilities are in any event not entirely eradicable short of the
adoption of unrealistically rigorous standards of authentication.
If the possibilities of fraud and mistake attendant upon the allowance
of party writings as self-authenticating are deemed minimal, the principal
objection to the adoption of a positive view concerning the presumptive
70 This "loophole" in rule 37(c) is pointed out in Finman, "The Request for Ad-
missions in Federal Civil Procedure," 71 Yale LJ. 371, 427 (1962).
71 Ultimately to obtain reimbursement of his costs, the party whose request for an
admission under rule 36 has been denied must surmount two hurdles. First, he must prove
the truth of the matter concerning which the admission was sought, and second, it must
appear to the court that there were no good reasons for the denial. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(c).
72 Rule 37(c) does not provide for the prospective assessment of costs of proof; see
United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.RD. 197
(S .D.N.Y. 1959).
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authenticity of these writings may be that no limits, however broad,
should be imposed upon the capacity of private writings to authenticate
themselves. It has been suggested that cases may arise in which a pre-
sumption of authenticity might well be indulged even as to third-party
writings,7" and any judicial disposition to indulge such a presumption even
in seemingly appropriate instances might well be inhibited by a rule which
could implicitly be viewed as limiting the capacity of self-authentication
to a broadly defined class of writings.74 As against this objection, it should
be noted that the fear of over-specificity may well lead to the fault of
over-generality. The orthodoxy concerning the general incapacity of
private writings to authenticate themselves is well entrenched, and it may
be conjectured that a trial court might experience some reasonable mis-
givings in departing from that orthodoxy with any frequency on the basis
of a mandate phrased in the general terms of the proposed New Jersey
revision of Uniform Rule 67.11 Such misgivings, it is suggested, may not
be entirely disspelled by a committee comment that freedom to depart
from the orthodoxy is afforded "in cases that warrant it." Thus it would
appear that some specificity is needed if any escape from the orthodox
rule is to be effected. A more positive direction for exercising the new
freedom to depart from orthodoxy might well be considered by future
draftsmen addressing themselves to the problem of authentication.
73 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
74 Ehrich, "Unnecessary Difficulties of Proof," 32 Yale LJ. 436, 451 (1923): "The truth
cannot safely be determined if evidence which common experience indicates to be almost
certainly genuine is excluded from consideration. Regular patterns are not essential. Their
undue preservation is the bane of the law."
75 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence 222 (1963). As
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court (effective date postponed to Jan. 31, 1967), NJ.
Rule of Evidence 67 reads: "Authentication of the original or a copy of a writing is required
before it may be received in evidence. Authentication may be by evidence sufficient to sustain
a finding of its authenticity or by any other means provided by law."
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